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Abstract. We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a
network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players who reach agreement
are removed from the network without replacement. The global logic of efficient matchings
and the local nature of bargaining, in combination with the irreversible exit of player pairs
following agreements, create severe hurdles to the attainment of efficiency in equilibrium.
For many networks all Markov perfect equilibria of the bargaining game are inefficient,
even as players become patient. We investigate how incentives need to be structured in
order to achieve efficiency via subgame perfect, but non-Markovian, equilibria. The analysis
extends to an alternative model in which individual players are selected according to some
probability distribution, and a chosen player can select a neighbor with whom to bargain.
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1. Introduction
In many markets buyers and sellers need to be in specific relationships in order to trade.
A relationship may be defined by the possibility of production or assembly of a customized
good (e.g., manufacturing inputs) or the provision of a specialized service (e.g., technical
support). Relationships may also encode transportation costs, social contacts, technological
compatibility, joint business opportunities, free trade agreements, etc. In such markets trans-
actions take place through a network of bilateral relationships. The structure of the network
determines the nature of competition, the set of feasible agreements, and the potential gains
from trade. As attested by Jackson (2008) in a recent book on social and economic networks,
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the influence of the network structure on trading outcomes in non-cooperative decentralized
settings is a largely unexplored topic. The present paper and Manea (2011) attempt to fill
this gap for two distinct strategic environments using non-cooperative models of decentralized
bilateral bargaining in networks.
We consider these issues in a simple and natural setting in which bilateral bargaining
opportunities arrive at random. The model’s basic structure is in the spirit of models of
search (Pissarides (1979), Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), Rogerson, Shimer and Wright
(2005)) and of bargaining in markets (Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985, 1990), Gale (1987)).
Our modeling strategy is to focus on the role of network structure—and in that spirit we
allow for quite general networks—while keeping other elements of the model relatively simple.
The setting is as follows. We consider a network in which each pair of players connected
by a link can jointly produce a unit surplus. Different trading processes may be associated
with a given network structure. We consider two classes of processes, both of which generate
infinite horizon discrete time bargaining games. In the first model, in each period a link is
selected according to some probability distribution, and one of the two matched players is
randomly chosen to make an offer to the other player specifying a division of the unit surplus
between themselves. If the offer is accepted, the two players exit the game with the shares
agreed on. If the offer is rejected, the two players remain in the game for the next period.
Bargaining proceeds to the next period on the subnetwork induced by the set of remaining
players. We assume that all players have perfect information of all the events preceding any
of their decision nodes in the game. The players have a common discount factor.
In the second model we assume that players, rather than links, are selected probabilistically
and that a selected player can activate a link with any of his neighbors. Once the link is
activated, either player is chosen with equal probability to propose a share exactly as in the
former model. Apart from this difference in the matching technology, the two models are
identical. The models are of independent substantive interest, and their consideration yields
as a side benefit a robustness check on the constructions we develop.
We can think of the models as a stylized account of the interaction between agents who
have idiosyncratic supply and demand for some type of good or service. For instance, a
particular contractor may have a process for sale (e.g., battery production) that only works
for a subset of the firms in an industry (laptop manufacturing). Another contractor’s process
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Figure 1. Dynamic efficiency
may only work for another subset and so on. In contrast to network structures that have
received much attention in earlier related work, in our setting some agents may act as both
buyers and sellers for other agents in the network. In this context one may ask: How are
the relative strengths of the firms affected by the pattern of compatibilities (that is, the
network structure)? Which partnerships are possible in equilibrium and on what terms? Is
an efficient allocation of the processes achievable in equilibrium?
In general, whether or not some particular market mechanism is efficient is a central
question in economics. This issue has received much attention in the context of models of
decentralized trade in markets with random matching. What can be said in our model? In
our setting the structure of the network determines a maximum number of feasible matches
or total surplus that can be attained by a central planner. In order to achieve the maximum
total surplus, some pairs of connected players may need to refrain from reaching agreements
in various subgames. This requires that agreements arise only across specific “efficient”
links, and that particular players be “saved” to trade with some players who might oth-
erwise become isolated. The latter aspect of the model is crucial: efficiency entails global
consideration of the entire network structure whereas bilateral interactions are, of course,
local. A further problem is that the notion of efficiency is dynamic and history dependent.
Whether a link is efficient or not depends upon what links have already been removed (as a
result of earlier agreements). This makes it difficult to attain efficiency and also complicates
the welfare analysis of equilibria.
These issues are illustrated by the network in Figure 1. The maximum total surplus of
3 units in this network can be achieved by two efficient matchings: {(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6)}
4 DILIP ABREU AND MIHAI MANEA
and {(1, 6), (2, 3), (4, 5)}. The link (2, 4) does not belong to any efficient matching, thus
an agreement between players 2 and 4 is inefficient. All other links are part of efficient
matchings, and hence an agreement across any of these links at the initial stage does not
preclude a welfare maximizing outcome. However, prior agreements across some efficient
links may turn formerly efficient links into inefficient ones. For instance, both links (1, 2)
and (4, 5) are efficient in the initial network, but if one of them is removed as a result
of an agreement between the corresponding players, the other becomes inefficient in the
subnetwork which remains. In general, along histories that involve only efficient agreements,
the inefficiency of a link at some stage is perpetuated at all later stages, while links that are
initially consistent with efficiency may become inefficient in the future.
Consider now the 4-player network illustrated in Figure 2, which will be discussed in detail
later. In this network efficiency requires that player 1 reach agreement with player 2, and
player 3 with player 4, resulting in the maximum total surplus of two units. In particular,
it is not efficient for player 2 to reach agreements with players 3 or 4. Consider the game
induced by this network where each link is equally likely to be selected for bargaining as long
as no agreement has been reached. We first examine Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs). In
our setting, the natural notion of a Markov state is given by the network induced by players
who did not reach agreement, along with nature’s selection of a link and a proposer.
One can show that for every discount factor there is a unique MPE in which agreement
obtains with (conditional) probability 1 across every link. Then with probability 1/2 one
of the inefficient links (2, 3) and (2, 4) is selected for bargaining in the first period, and
yields an agreement that leaves the other two players disconnected. In this event players do
not coordinate their agreements to generate a total surplus of two units, and only one unit
of surplus is created on the equilibrium path. Thus the (unique) MPE in this example is
inefficient, even asymptotically as players become patient.
Might we attain efficiency via the use of non-Markovian strategies? The answer to this
question is far from clear as has been hinted at by the discussion above regarding the tension
between the global structure of efficiency and the local nature of bilateral interactions. This
issue is particularly acute because if a pair of agents consummates an inefficient trade then
they disappear from the network and are thus immune to any future sanctions. Nevertheless,
we are able to show how incentives may be structured in order to achieve efficiency. Our
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Figure 2. Asymptotically inefficient MPEs
equilibrium construction, of necessity, entails (subgame perfect) non-Markovian behavior
and the use of punishments and rewards.
Players who resist the temptation to reach inefficient agreements are rewarded by their
neighbors, and players who do not conform to the rewarding procedure are punished via
the threat of inefficient agreements that result in their isolation. The exact design of the
incentives is delicate because of the evolving nature of the network structure as punish-
ments and rewards are underway. The analysis entails showing precisely when and how the
ultimate sanction, which prescribes the isolation of “deviators” from the network, can be
implemented, while maintaining incentives in subgames that arise in the process of delivering
the punishment.
These issues arise, albeit in a very manageable way, even in the relatively uncomplicated
example of Figure 1. In that network, the presence of the inefficient link (2, 4) enables
players 2 and 4 to extract “rewards” (relative to a more symmetric split) from players 1
and 3, and respectively 3 and 5. (Such rewards are necessary in order to prevent players 2
and 4 from reaching an inefficient agreement with each other.) Punishing player 1 for not
rewarding 2 entails inducing players 5 and 6, and then 2 and 4, to reach agreements. This
sequence of agreements isolates player 1 from the network. It may be necessary to “force”
an agreement between players 5 and 6 along the latter punishment path via the following
threat: if 5 and 6 fail to reach agreement when matched to bargain with each other, then
player 5 will eventually be isolated (in some contingencies). In turn, the isolation of 5 may
be implemented by incentive compatible agreements across the links (1, 6) and (2, 4), in the
event that these links are selected for bargaining.
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Since the network structure evolves as players reach agreements and links are removed, our
bargaining game is not a repeated game but a stochastic game. While there has been earlier
analysis of general classes of stochastic games—for example, Dutta (1995)—the results from
this literature do not apply to our setting. In particular, Dutta assumes that the feasible
payoffs are independent of the initial state. This assumption is robustly violated in our
setting, since players who reach agreement are permanently removed from the network.
The irreversible evolution of the network structure as play proceeds makes it difficult
to check incentives. For that reason, our approach is to build as much as possible on an
implicitly defined Markov strategy. As MPEs may be inefficient, we consider an MPE of a
modified game which differs from the original game primarily in that it prohibits inefficient
agreements. This automatically accounts for most of the relevant incentives in the original
game. The incentives to deviate that arise from the modifications of the original game are
the only ones we need to address via explicit constructions of rewards and punishments.
The reward and punishment paths are calibrated to the network under consideration. As
remarked in the conclusion, many aspects of this argument are new and potentially useful
in other network or, more generally, stochastic game settings.
We now turn to some related literature. Properties of MPEs in our main model are
of independent interest. We explore these in a companion paper (Abreu and Manea 2009).
Another related paper, Manea (2011), assumes that players who reach agreement are replaced
by new players at the same positions in the network. Thus the network structure is stationary.
In the current paper, by contrast, the evolution of the network plays a central role.
There is an extensive literature on bargaining in markets starting with Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1985). Important subsequent papers include Gale (1987), Binmore and Herrero
(1988), and Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990). The network structure underlying these models
of bargaining in markets is very particular. Specifically, all agents belong to one of two
groups, buyers or sellers, and every buyer is connected to every seller. In consonance with
the results obtained in this literature, for such networks, the payoffs in any MPE of our
bargaining game converge to the competitive equilibrium outcome as players become patient.
However, our interest here is in arbitrary networks. As we demonstrate, for some networks,
even efficiency may be unattainable in an MPE (in the patient limit).
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Polanski (2007) considers a related model in which the matching technology is fundamen-
tally different and efficient matchings are guaranteed by assumption. Kranton and Minehart
(2001) and Corominas-Bosch (2004) also study trade in networks, but their models are based
on centralized simultaneous auctions. In contrast to the preceding papers, we focus on de-
centralized bargaining. Further discussion and additional references can be found in Manea
(2011).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main model. In
Section 3 we establish the existence of asymptotically efficient equilibria. Section 4 extends
the analysis to the alternative model, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Framework
Let N denote the set of n players, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. A network is an undirected
graph H = (V,E) with set of vertices V ⊂ N and set of edges (also called links) E ⊂
{(i, j)|i 6= j ∈ V } such that (j, i) ∈ E whenever (i, j) ∈ E. We identify the links (i, j) and
(j, i), and use the shorthand ij or ji instead. We say that player i is connected in H to
player j if ij ∈ E. We often abuse notation and write i ∈ H for i ∈ V and ij ∈ H for ij ∈ E.
A player is isolated in H if he has no links in H. A network H ′ = (V ′, E ′) is a subnetwork
of H if V ′ ⊂ V and E ′ ⊂ E. A network H ′ = (V ′, E ′) is the subnetwork of H induced
by V ′ if E ′ = E ∩ (V ′ × V ′). We write H 	 V ′′ for the subnetwork of H induced by the
vertices in V \ V ′′. We assume that for every network H with a non-empty set of links there
is an associated probability distribution over links (pij(H))ij∈H with pij(H) > 0,∀ij ∈ H.
No additional constraints are imposed on the function p for a given H or across subnetworks
H.
Let G be a fixed network with vertex set N . A link ij in G is interpreted as the ability
of players i and j to jointly generate a unit surplus.1 Consider the following infinite horizon
bargaining game generated by the network G. Let G0 = G. Each period t = 0, 1, . . ., if the
set of links of Gt is empty, then the game ends; otherwise, a single link ij in Gt is selected with
probability pij(Gt) and one of the players (the proposer) i and j is chosen randomly (with
equal conditional probability) to make an offer to the other player (the responder) specifying
a division of the unit surplus between themselves. If the responder accepts the offer, the two
1We do not exclude networks in which some players are isolated.
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players exit the game with the shares agreed on. If the responder rejects the offer, the two
players remain in the game for the next period. In period t + 1 the game is repeated with
the set of players from period t, except for i and j in case period t ends in agreement, on the
subnetwork Gt+1 induced by this set of players in G. Hence Gt+1 = Gt 	 {i, j} if players i
and j reach an agreement in period t, and Gt+1 = Gt otherwise. All players share a discount
factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The bargaining game is denoted Γδ(G).
We assume that each player has perfect information of all the events preceding any of his
decision nodes in the game. We restrict our attention to subgame perfect Nash equilibria
of Γδ(G). We are also interested in Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs). These are subgame
perfect equilibria in strategies in which after any history, future behavior only depends on
the network induced by the remaining players, the link selected by nature, and the identity
of the proposer.
In Abreu and Manea (2009) we establish the existence of MPEs. We refer the reader
to that paper for (the formal proof and) an intuitive account of the main elements of the
argument.
Proposition 1. There exists a Markov perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game Γδ(G).
3. Asymptotically Efficient Equilibria
Fix a network G˜. We introduce some concepts for the purpose of studying the welfare
properties of subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining game Γδ(G˜) for high δ. A match
of G˜ is a subnetwork of G˜ in which every player has exactly one link. The maximum total
surplus of G˜, denoted µ(G˜), is the maximum number of links in a match of G˜. An efficient
match of G˜, generically denoted by M˜ , is a match with µ(G˜) links. A link is G˜-efficient if
it is included in an efficient match of G˜, and G˜-inefficient otherwise. A player is always
efficiently matched in G˜ if he is included in every efficient match of G˜. The following
simple observation is used repeatedly below.
If ij is a G˜-inefficient link then i and j are always efficiently matched in G˜.2
2For a proof by contradiction, suppose that ij is G˜-inefficient and i is not always efficiently matched in G˜.
Then there is an efficient match M˜ of G˜ that does not include i. Another efficient match M˜ ′ of G˜ can be
obtained by deleting j’s link in M˜ (if any) and adding the link ij to M˜ . But ij ∈ M˜ ′ implies that ij is
G˜-efficient, a contradiction.
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A set of players ˜˜N in G˜ is G˜-efficiently closed if for any G˜-efficient link lm, the set {l,m}
is either contained in ˜˜N or disjoint from ˜˜N .
We measure the welfare of an equilibrium σ∗δ(G˜) of Γδ(G˜) as the sum of expected utilities
of all players in that equilibrium, denoted W (σ∗δ(G˜)). Since each player can only be involved
in one transaction, each transaction yields a unit surplus, and only connected pairs of players
can transact, for every δ ∈ (0, 1) and any equilibrium σ∗δ(G˜) of Γδ(G˜), the welfare W (σ∗δ(G˜))
cannot exceed µ(G˜). For δ ∈ (0, 1), a family of equilibria (σ∗δ(G˜))δ∈(δ,1) corresponding to
the games (Γδ(G˜))δ∈(δ,1) is asymptotically efficient if limδ→1W (σ∗δ(G˜)) = µ(G˜).
To generate the maximum total surplus µ(G˜) in Γδ(G˜) as players become patient, pairs
of players connected by links that are inefficient in the induced subnetworks in various
subgames need to refrain from reaching agreements. However, providing incentives against
agreements that are collectively inefficient is a difficult task. Some players may be concerned
that passing up bargaining opportunities may lead to agreements involving their potential
bargaining partners which undermine their position in the network in future bargaining
encounters. Indeed, one can easily find networks for which all MPEs of the bargaining game
are asymptotically inefficient as players become patient.
The network G4 illustrated in Figure 3, with a uniform probability distribution describ-
ing the selection of links for bargaining, induces the simplest bargaining game that does
not possess asymptotically efficient MPEs. In Abreu and Manea (2009) we prove that for
every δ ∈ (0, 1), the game Γδ(G4) has a unique MPE. In the MPE agreement occurs with
probability 1 across every link selected for bargaining in the first period. The limit MPE
payoffs are found to be 11/56 ≈ .196 for player 1, 5/8 = .625 for player 2, and 19/56 ≈ .339
for players 3 and 4. The limit MPE welfare is 11/56+5/8+2×19/56 = 3/2, which is smaller
than the maximum total surplus µ(G4) = 2. The set of MPEs is not asymptotically efficient
because, for every δ ∈ (0, 1), in the unique MPE of Γδ(G4), with probability 1/2 one of the
Γδ(G4)-inefficient links (2, 3) and (2, 4) is selected for bargaining in the first period, leading
to an agreement that leaves the other two players disconnected. In this event players do not
coordinate their agreements in order to generate the maximum total surplus of two units,
and only one unit of surplus is created on the equilibrium path.
10 DILIP ABREU AND MIHAI MANEA
. 3 3 9
1
2
3 4
. 3 3 9
. 6 2 5
. 1 9 6
Figure 3. Asymptotically inefficient MPEs for the bargaining game on G4
We seek to show that for every network structure G the bargaining game Γδ(G) admits
asymptotically efficient equilibria. For this purpose, we introduce a new bargaining game,
Γ¯δ(G), which is a modification of the benchmark bargaining game Γδ(G) that in equilibrium
“prohibits” agreements across inefficient links in any subgame by adding a fine of −1 to the
regular payoffs of any player involved in such an agreement. In addition, due to the details
of our overall equilibrium construction, for particular subnetworks that may be induced by
subgames, if certain efficient links and proposers are chosen, Γ¯δ(G) “imposes” agreements
in equilibrium via fining the proposer with a payoff of −1 in case his offer is rejected. In all
other respects Γ¯δ(G) is identical to Γδ(G).
It is clear that the artificial payoff modifications induce the desired disagreements and
agreements in any equilibrium of Γ¯δ(G). In the event that G has multiple efficient matchings,
our definition of Γ¯δ(G) does not preclude any of these matchings from emerging as the
outcome of a sequence of agreements that do not involve fines. The key idea is to employ
MPEs of Γ¯δ(G) in the construction of non-Markovian asymptotically efficient equilibria for
Γδ(G) based on rewards and punishments.
The following concept is necessary for the definition of Γ¯δ(G) (and for the rest of the
equilibrium construction). A network G˜ is perfect if in G˜ all non-isolated players are
always efficiently matched.3 In the modified bargaining game Γ¯δ(G) generated by the
network G, the moves of nature and the strategies of the players are identical to those in
the original game Γδ(G). Only the payoff functions are modified in particular situations as
follows. Suppose that the players remaining in the game at time t induce the network Gt
and that the link ij is selected for bargaining, with i being chosen to make an offer to j. If j
3For example, the network G4 is perfect, while the one obtained by removing the link (3, 4) from G4 is not.
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accepts the offer and ij is Gt-inefficient then i and j obtain the shares agreed on minus 1. If
j rejects the offer and ij is Gt-efficient, and in addition the conditions (1) Gt is perfect and
(2) j has a Gt-inefficient link are satisfied, then i receives a time t payoff of −1.4
As in the case of the benchmark bargaining game Γδ(G), a Markov perfect equilibrium
for the modified bargaining game Γ¯δ(G) is defined as a subgame perfect equilibrium in
strategies that only condition on each history of past bargaining encounters through the
network induced by the remaining players after that history. Trivial modifications to the
proof of Proposition 1 (Abreu and Manea 2009) show existence of MPEs for Γ¯δ(G).
For each δ ∈ (0, 1), fix an MPE σ¯∗δ(G) of Γ¯δ(G). Due to the artificial payoff modifications
defining Γ¯δ(G), it must be that under σ¯∗δ(G), in any subgame that induces the network G˜,
disagreement occurs across G˜-inefficient links, and agreement obtains across G˜-efficient links
where the responder has a G˜-inefficient link if G˜ is perfect. In this sense σ¯∗δ(G) “prohibits”
agreements in the former situations and “imposes” agreements in the latter. Let G be the
set of subnetworks of G induced by the players remaining in any subgame of Γ¯δ(G) (on or
off the equilibrium path). The following definitions apply for all subnetworks G˜ ∈ G. Let
(σ¯∗δi (G˜))i∈G˜ be the MPE of Γ¯
δ(G˜) determined by σ¯∗δ(G) in a subgame of Γ¯δ(G) where the
remaining players induce the network G˜, and (v∗δi (G˜))i∈G˜ be the payoffs yielded by σ¯
∗δ(G˜).
We refer to the latter as the G˜-quasi-Markov payoffs.5 Denote by p∗δij (G˜) the probability
of an agreement between i and j in Γ¯δ(G˜) under σ¯∗δ(G˜).
Definition 1, Lemma 1, and Proposition 2 below, concerning limit equilibrium agreements
and payoffs in various subgames of Γ¯δ(G) under σ¯∗δ(G), are used in the construction of
asymptotically efficient equilibria for Γδ(G).
Definition 1. A sequence of discount factors (δα)α≥0 with limα→∞ δα = 1 is well-behaved if
the sequences (p∗δαij (G˜))α≥0 and (v
∗δα
k (G˜))α≥0 converge as α→∞ for every link ij and player
k in G˜ and for all G˜ ∈ G.
A sequence of discount factors that converges to 1 is well-behaved if the payoffs and
agreement probabilities under σ¯∗δ(G) across all subgames of Γ¯δ(G) converge for δ along the
4With this payoff modification some players may receive non-zero payoffs in more than one period. However,
this cannot happen in equilibrium.
5Note that the “quasi-” qualification alludes to the modification of the bargaining game from Γδ(G˜) to Γ¯δ(G˜),
and not to any alteration in the Markov solution concept.
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sequence. The statements of Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 below, as well as Lemmata 2-6 in
Appendix A, apply to each (fixed) subnetwork G˜ ∈ G and every (fixed) well-behaved sequence
of discount factors (δα)α≥0. The corresponding limits of (v∗δαi (G˜))α≥0 and (p
∗δα
ij (G˜))α≥0 as
α→∞ are denoted by v∗i (G˜) and p∗ij(G˜), respectively.6 The proofs appear in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. Suppose that ˜˜N is a G˜-efficiently closed set of players who are not all isolated
in G˜. Then there exist two players i, j ∈ ˜˜N with ij ∈ G˜ and p∗ij(G˜) = pij(G˜).
The interpretation of the equality p∗ij(G˜) = pij(G˜) from Lemma 1 is that when i and j
are matched to bargain in the first period of Γ¯δα(G˜), they reach agreement almost surely as
α → ∞. We obtain the corollary below by setting ˜˜N equal to the set of vertices of G˜ in
Lemma 1.
Corollary 1. Suppose that G˜ is a network with a non-empty set of links. Then there exists
a link ij ∈ G˜ such that p∗ij(G˜) = pij(G˜) > 0.
Remark 1. The definition of the modified bargaining game and the iterative application of
Corollary 1 lead to the conclusion that for any pi < 1, there exists an integer T such that
the limit probability as α→∞ that Γ¯δα(G) ends and an efficient matching of G arises in T
(or fewer) periods exceeds pi. It follows that
lim
α→∞
∑
i∈N
v∗δαi (G) = µ(G).
Thus a family of equilibria (whose existence we intend to establish) of Γδα(G) yielding the
payoffs v∗δα(G) (for sufficiently large α) must be asymptotically efficient.
The next result establishes that players who are always efficiently matched in G˜ are rela-
tively strong in Γ¯δ(G˜), in the sense that their limit G˜-quasi-Markov payoffs are greater than
or equal to 1/2.
Proposition 2. Suppose that player i is always efficiently matched in G˜. Then v∗i (G˜) ≥ 1/2.
If additionally G˜ is a perfect network, then v∗i (G˜) = 1/2.
We are now prepared to state and prove the main result.
6Note that the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem implies that any sequence of discount factors converging to 1
has a well-behaved subsequence (relevant for the aforementioned results).
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Theorem 1. There exists δ so that for δ > δ the bargaining game Γδ(G) admits an equi-
librium σ∗δ(G) with expected payoffs identical to the G-quasi-Markov payoffs v∗δ(G). The
family of equilibria (σ∗δ(G))δ∈(δ,1) is asymptotically efficient.
If the first part of the theorem were not true, then we could find a well-behaved sequence of
discount factors (δα)α≥0 converging to 1 such that Γδα(G) does not admit an equilibrium with
expected payoffs v∗δα(G) for any α ≥ 0 (see footnote 6). Fix such a sequence, and denote
the limits of (v∗δαi (G˜))α≥0 and (p
∗δα
ij (G˜))α≥0 as α→∞ by v∗i (G˜) and p∗ij(G˜), respectively, for
all relevant i, j, G˜. In the proof below, we obtain a contradiction by constructing a strategy
profile σ∗δα(G) which, for sufficiently large α, constitutes an equilibrium of Γδα(G) with
expected payoffs v∗δα(G).
For each α ≥ 0, σ∗δα(G) is based on the MPE σ¯∗δα(G) of the modified bargaining game
Γ¯δα(G). By definition σ¯∗δα(G) satisfies the incentive constraints for Γ¯δα(G), and we wish to
exploit this fact in our equilibrium construction for Γδα(G). However, Γ¯δα(G) differs from
Γδα(G) in subgames with induced subnetwork G˜ by payoff modifications that in equilibrium
(1) “prohibit” agreements across G˜-inefficient links;
(2) “impose” agreements, when G˜ is perfect, across G˜-efficient links where the responder
has a G˜-inefficient link.
If the equilibrium σ∗δα(G) is to be constructed “on top of” σ¯∗δα(G) we need to modify the
latter in a non-Markovian fashion to make disagreement incentive compatible in case (1) and
agreement incentive compatible in case (2) without recourse to artificial payoff modifications.
We achieve this by rewarding players for resisting “tempting” offers across inefficient links
and conversely by punishing the particular players who do not conform to the prescribed
rewarding procedure or do not achieve imposed agreements as the case might be.
Consider four players h, i, j, k such that ij is G˜-inefficient and there is an efficient match of
G˜ that contains the links ih and jk. Such configurations are central to the proof of Theorem
1. Assume for the moment that h, i, j, k are the only players not isolated in G˜. Note that
h and k are not linked in G˜ because ij is G˜-inefficient. Hence an agreement between i and
j would leave h and k isolated. Our equilibrium construction for Γδα(G˜) requires that if i
makes a tempting offer to j then j refuses (point (1) above), and if k is selected to make an
offer to j in the next round then k gives j a reward (relative to v∗δαj (G˜)). We incentivize k to
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reward j via the following threat. If k does not provide the prescribed reward and the link ij
is selected for bargaining in the subsequent round then i and j forge an agreement. Lemma
7 in Appendix A shows that δα(v
∗δα
i (G˜) + v
∗δα
j (G˜)) < 1, so in the absence of punishments
and rewards relative to the G˜-quasi-Markov payoffs, players i and j have incentives to follow
through with their threat. If the link ij is not selected in the next round, then play reverts
to the pre-deviation regime, which (if followed) leads to the quasi-Markov payoffs. Of course,
an agreement between i and j imposes a severe loss on k (isolation yields zero payoff), which
outweighs the modest gift he was originally supposed to give j.7
However, the approach sketched above is difficult to implement in general as h, i, j, k may
be embedded in a complex, larger network G˜. We demonstrate that a particular series
of equilibrium agreements trims G˜ down to a perfect network that contains h, i, j, k. Our
construction relies on Proposition 2, which implies that in the game Γδα(G˜) the temptation
(relative to the G˜-quasi-Markov payoffs) of an agreement between i and j—measured by
1− δα(v∗δαi (G˜) + v∗δαj (G˜))—and the reward for j in excess of δαv∗δαj (G˜) sufficient to deter the
agreement vanish as α→∞. Furthermore, rewards and punishments are administered only
in subgames where all players have limit quasi-Markov payoffs of 1/2 as α → ∞. Hence it
suffices to reward j and punish k only along some histories which arise with positive limit
probability. The role of “imposed” agreements (point (2) above) is to ensure that k makes
an acceptable offer to j following these histories regardless of whether i tempted j. Then i
cannot manipulate the distribution over agreements by making unacceptable offers to j that
are tempting with respect to j’s quasi-Markov payoff and does not have incentives to set off
the reward procedure using such offers.
It remains to show that it is possible to punish k with isolation if he does not offer j the
prescribed reward. This is implemented by further trimming the network down to a situation
where h, i, j, k are the only non-isolated players. Finally, we need to provide incentives
for agreements across links that are trimmed to facilitate k’s isolation and for “imposed”
agreements. We achieve this by a similar process of isolating the relevant deviator, who
is now cast in the role of player k above and so on, with the continuing threat of new
deviators replacing old deviators. The exact design of punishment and reward paths and the
7As usual, it is sufficient to consider one-shot incentives to deviate.
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verification of equilibrium incentives are delicate and account for much of the complexity of
the argument, to which we turn next.
Proof. After any history that induces a particular network G˜, the constructed equlibrium
may fall into one of three types of regimes. In the default regime for G˜ behavior conforms
to σ¯δα(G˜). The i tempted j regime for G˜ rewards a player j in case he rejects a tempting
offer (relative to his G˜-quasi-Markov payoff) from i when ij is a G˜-inefficient link. The
j punishes k regime for G˜ penalizes player k and benefits player j (relative to their
corresponding G˜-quasi-Markov payoffs) in case k refuses to follow some behavior prescribed
by either of the three regimes (e.g., rewarding j in the i tempted j regime for G˜ or reaching
an imposed agreement with j in the default regime for G˜). The definitions of the latter two
regimes are restricted to sets of G˜, i, j and respectively G˜, j, k left to be specified.
Set
ε :=
(
min
lm∈H∈G
plm(H)
2
)n/2
.
We later argue that the payoffs delivered by the three regimes are as follows. The de-
fault regime for G˜ yields payoffs identical to the G˜-quasi-Markov payoffs v∗δα(G˜). The i
tempted j regime for G˜ delivers a payoff greater than 1/2 + ε3 to j for large α and a
payoff identical to the G˜-quasi-Markov payoff v∗δαi (G˜) to i. The j punishes k regime for
G˜ provides payoffs smaller than 1/2− ε2 to k and larger than 1/2 + ε2 to j for large α.
In our construction, first period play is according to the default regime for G. The
default regime is, in equilibrium—i.e., when players do not deviate—an absorbing regime.
Consequently strategies in the default regime for G˜ determine a distribution over bargaining
outcomes in Γδα(G˜) identical to the distribution induced by the MPE σ¯∗δα(G˜) in Γ¯δα(G˜) and
yield payoffs equal to the G˜-quasi-Markov payoffs v∗δα(G˜). Moreover, in the default regime,
deviations other than those arising in the cases (1) and (2) above are ignored. That is, they
do not result in a change of regime. These facts greatly simplify the checking of incentives
below.
In the default regime for G˜ strategies are as follows. Suppose i is selected to make an
offer to j. If ij is G˜-efficient, then the regime specifies that i and j behave according to the
first period strategies induced by σ¯∗δα(G˜) in Γ¯δα(G˜). If in addition G˜ is perfect and j has a
G˜-inefficient link (corresponding to the “imposed” agreements from case (2) above) and an
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offer from i smaller than δαv
∗δα
j (G˜) is rejected by j, then play switches to the j punishes
i regime for G˜. If ij is G˜-inefficient with v∗i (G˜) + v
∗
j (G˜) > 1, then the regime specifies
that i offer 0 and j accept only offers greater than δαv
∗δα
j (G˜). If ij is G˜-inefficient with
v∗i (G˜) + v
∗
j (G˜) ≤ 1 (effectively corresponding to the “tempting” circumstances of case (1)
above), then the regime specifies that i offer 0 and j accept only offers greater than or equal
to δα(1/2 + ε
3); following any offer from i in the interval (0, δα(1/2 + ε
3)) rejected by j play
switches to the i tempted j regime for G˜. The two new regimes are defined below.
Players do not have incentives to make one shot deviations in Γδα(G˜) from the behavior
prescribed by the default regime for G˜ in bargaining encounters for which no action can lead
to an exit from the regime. To see this, recall that σ¯∗δα(G˜) is an MPE of Γ¯δα(G˜) with payoffs
v∗δα(G˜), and compliance with the default regime for G˜ also yields payoffs v∗δα(G˜). For large
α, this includes the case of G˜-inefficient links ij with v∗i (G˜) + v
∗
j (G˜) > 1. For such i and
j, player j’s response is optimal because rejection of any offer leads to the default regime
for G˜, where his continuation payoff is δαv
∗δα
j (G˜). Player i does not have incentives to make
an acceptable offer because any agreement would obtain him less than 1− δαv∗δαj (G˜), while
disagreement leads to the default regime for G˜ where his continuation payoff is δαv
∗δα
i (G˜).
The condition v∗i (G˜) + v
∗
j (G˜) > 1 implies that 1− δαv∗δαj (G˜) < δαv∗δαi (G˜) for large α.
We next address incentives in Γδα(G˜) for the default regime for G˜ in bargaining encounters
that lead to transitions away from the regime. Consider first the case in which i is “forced” to
make an acceptable offer to j (i.e., G˜ is perfect, ij is G˜-efficient, and j has a G˜-inefficient link).
Note that σ¯∗δα(G˜) must specify that i offer δαv∗δαj (G˜) to j and j accept with probability 1 any
offer at least as large. By Proposition 2, since G˜ is a perfect network, limα→∞ δαv∗δαj (G˜) =
1/2. For large α, player j has incentives to follow the behavior prescribed by the default
regime for G˜ since rejection of offers smaller than δαv
∗δα
j (G˜) leads to the j punishes i
regime for G˜ with payoff larger than 1/2+ε2, while rejection of offers greater than or equal
to δαv
∗δα
j (G˜) yields the default regime for G˜ payoff of δαv
∗δα
j (G˜). For large α, player i has
incentives to follow the behavior prescribed by the default regime for G˜ because offers larger
than or equal to δαv
∗δα
j (G˜) are accepted, while smaller offers are rejected leading to the j
punishes i regime for G˜ with payoff smaller than 1/2− ε2.
Consider now the case in which i is selected to make an offer to j, when ij is G˜-inefficient
with v∗i (G˜) + v
∗
j (G˜) ≤ 1. As ij is G˜-inefficient, i and j are always efficiently matched in G˜,
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and thus v∗i (G˜), v
∗
j (G˜) ≥ 1/2 by Proposition 2. Consequently, v∗i (G˜) = v∗j (G˜) = 1/2. For
large α, player j has incentives to reject any offer in (0, δα(1/2 + ε
3)) from player i, since by
rejecting such offers j obtains a discounted payoff greater than δα(1/2+ε
3) in the i tempted
j regime for G˜. Player j has incentives to accept offers greater than or equal to δα(1/2+ε
3)
from i because rejection of such offers results in a continuation payoff of δαv
∗δα
j (G˜), which is
less than δα(1/2+ε
3) for large α. Player i cannot (strictly) benefit from making unacceptable
offers to j that trigger the i tempted j regime for G˜ since his expected payoff in that
case is δαv
∗δα
i (G˜). Also, i does not have incentives to make acceptable offers to j for large α
because δαv
∗δα
i (G˜) > 1− δα(1/2 + ε3).
The i tempted j regime for G˜ is defined for ij ∈ G˜ ∈ G such that ij is G˜-inefficient
with v∗i (G˜) = v
∗
j (G˜) = 1/2. For such i, j, G˜, Lemma 4 from Appendix A establishes the
existence of a sequence of links l1m1, . . . , ls¯ms¯ in G˜ 	 {i, j}, with associated subnetworks
G˜s := G˜	{l1,m1, . . . , ls−1,ms−1}, such that p∗lsms(G˜s) = plsms(G˜s) for s = 1, . . . , s¯ and G˜s¯+1
is perfect. Clearly, j is always efficiently matched in G˜s¯+1 and must have a G˜s¯+1-efficient
link to a player k ( 6= i). We add the link ls¯+1ms¯+1 with ls¯+1 = k,ms¯+1 = j to the sequence.
Player j is rewarded by player k in period s¯ + 1 of the regime only if nature selects ls to
make an offer to ms in period s of the regime for each s = 1, . . . , s¯ + 1. The reward path
is described by the history where in period s, ls offers δαv
∗δα
ms (G˜s) for s ≤ s¯, ls¯+1 = k offers
δα(1/2 + ε
2) to ms¯+1 = j for s = s¯+ 1, and player ms accepts the offer in each case. For any
first instance s of the regime in which the play of nature or of players ls and ms deviates
from the reward path in ways different from the ones emphasized below, strategies revert to
the default regime for the corresponding subgame.
In the i tempted j regime for G˜ strategies are as follows. Suppose ls is selected to
make an offer to ms in period s of the regime. For all s ≤ s¯, players ls and ms behave
according to the first period strategies induced by σ¯∗δα(G˜s) in Γ¯δα(G˜s). Then behavior on
and off the reward path is identical to play in the corresponding default regime. Thus ls and
ms have incentives to follow the prescribed behavior in period s of the i tempted j regime
for G˜ because they have in the default regime for G˜s.
Period s¯ + 1 of the regime specifies that ls¯+1 = k offer δα(1/2 + ε
2) and ms¯+1 = j accept
only offers at least as large. If k makes an offer smaller than δα(1/2 + ε
2) that j rejects, then
k is punished by switching to the j punishes k regime for G˜s¯+1 (the regime is well-defined
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because ij is G˜s¯+1-inefficient and jk is G˜s¯+1-efficient). For large α, it is optimal for k to
offer δα(1/2 + ε
2) to j and for j to reject smaller offers because rejection of offers smaller
than δα(1/2 + ε
2) leads to the j punishes k regime for G˜s¯+1 with discounted payoffs below
δα(1/2− ε2) < 1− δα(1/2 + ε2) for k and above δα(1/2 + ε2) for j. Player j has incentives to
accept offers greater than or equal to δα(1/2 + ε
2) for large α because rejecting such an offer
would leave him with a limit payoff of 1/2 in the default regime for G˜s¯+1 (by Proposition 2,
as G˜s¯+1 is perfect).
The reward path and the strategies for the i tempted j regime for G˜ are constructed
so that under this regime the distribution over pairs reaching agreement for any subgame is
identical to the one in the corresponding default regime,8 and the only agreement reached on
different terms in the two regimes involves j and k on the reward path. Hence, as desired,
all players different from j and k, in particular i, receive payoffs equal to their corresponding
G˜-quasi-Markov payoffs.
For large α, the i tempted j regime for G˜ delivers a payoff greater than 1/2+ε3 to j for
the following reasons. As α→∞, the limit payoff of j is 1/2 + ε2 along the reward path of
the regime, which realizes with limit probability (strictly) larger than ε,9 and identical to the
corresponding limit quasi-Markov payoffs of at least 1/2 along any other path. The latter
fact is true since j is always efficiently matched in G˜, and also in the subnetwork induced
by any subgame off the reward path, where players behave according to the corresponding
default regime. By Proposition 2, j receives limit quasi-Markov payoffs of at least 1/2 in
such subgames.
The j punishes k regime for G˜ is defined for perfect networks G˜ ∈ G for which jk
is G˜-efficient and there exists i such that ij is G˜-inefficient. In such cases, let h denote i’s
match in an arbitrary efficient match of G˜ that includes the link jk. For the given h, i, j, k, G˜,
Lemmata 5 and 6 in Appendix A construct a sequence of links in G˜	 {h, i, j, k}
l1m1, . . . , ls1ms1 , ls1+1ms1+1, . . . , ls2ms2 ,
8Note the relevance for this conclusion of “forcing” k to make an acceptable offer to j in Γ¯δα(G˜s¯+1).
9The length of the reward path is smaller than n/2, and conditional on reaching period s − 1, the reward
path proceeds to the next period with a probability of at least p∗δαlsms(G˜s) − plsms(G˜s)/2, whose limit as
α→∞ is plsms(G˜s)/2 (Lemma 4), which is greater than or equal to minlm∈H∈G plm(H)/2.
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with associated subnetworks G˜s := G˜ 	 {l1,m1, . . . , ls−1,ms−1}, satisfying the following
conditions:
(1) lsms is G˜s-efficient for s = 1, . . . , s2
(2) ms has a G˜s-efficient link to i or j for s = 1, . . . , s1 (corresponding to Lemma 5)
(3) p∗lsms(G˜s) = plsms(G˜s) for s = s1 + 1, . . . , s2 (corresponding to Lemma 6)
(4) all players different from h, i, j, k are isolated in G˜s2+1.
Let s¯ := s2 + 1. We add the link ls¯ms¯ with ls¯ = j,ms¯ = k to the sequence.
Player k is punished by player j in period s¯ of the regime only if nature selects ls to make an
offer to ms in period s of the regime for each s = 1, . . . , s¯. The punishment path is described
by the history where in period s nature selects ls to make an offer to ms, and ls offers
min(1 − δαv∗δαls (G˜s), δαv∗δαms (G˜s)) for s = 1, . . . , s1; ls offers δαv∗δαms (G˜s) for s = s1 + 1, . . . , s2;
and finally, ls¯ = j offers 1/2 − ε. The offers are accepted by ms in each case. For any first
instance s of the regime in which the play of nature or of players ls and ms deviates from
the punishment path in ways different from the ones emphasized below, strategies revert to
the default regime for the corresponding subgame.
In the j punishes k regime for G˜ strategies are as follows. Suppose ls is selected
to make an offer to ms in period s of the regime. For s = 1, . . . , s1, the regime specifies
that ls offer min(1 − δαv∗δαls (G˜s), δαv∗δαms (G˜s)) and ms accept any offer at least as large. By
definition, ms has a G˜s-efficient link to either i or j. Suppose that ms is G˜s-efficiently
linked to j (a similar construction of the strategies is needed when j is replaced by i). To
account for ms’s non-default response behavior, the punishment regime specifies that if an
offer from ls greater than or equal to min(1− δαv∗δαls (G˜s), δαv∗δαms (G˜s)) is rejected by ms, then
ms is penalized by switching to the j punishes ms regime for G˜s (the regime is well-defined
because ij is G˜s-inefficient and jms is G˜s-efficient). The optimality of ls’s offer of min(1 −
δαv
∗δα
ls
(G˜s), δαv
∗δα
ms (G˜s)) to ms given ms’s response strategy and of ms’s rejection of smaller
offers are immediately checked.10 By construction, G˜s is a perfect network, which coupled
with the second part of Proposition 2 implies that limα→∞min(1−δαv∗δαls (G˜s), δαv∗δαms (G˜s)) =
1/2. For large α, player ms has incentives to accept offers from ls greater than or equal to
10As mentioned earlier, for scenarios that are not explicitly discussed here, in particular for ones in which
ls offers ms less than min(1 − δαv∗δαls (G˜s), δαv∗δαms (G˜s)), play reverts to the default regime for the resulting
subgame.
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min(1−δαv∗δαls (G˜s), δαv∗δαms (G˜s)) since his payoff in the j punishes ms regime for G˜s is smaller
than 1/2− ε2.
For s = s1 + 1, . . . , s2, the j punishes k regime for G˜ specifies that players ls and ms
behave according to the first period strategies induced by σ¯∗δα(G˜s) in Γ¯δα(G˜s). Incentives
for players ls and ms to follow the prescribed behavior are provided as in the default regime
for G˜.
Recall that all players different from h, i, j, k are isolated in G˜s¯ and that ij is G˜s¯-inefficient.
Consequently, h and k are not connected in G˜s¯. There are 4 possible link configurations that
players h, i, j, k may induce in G˜s¯, depending on which subset of the links ik and jh is
included in G˜s¯. One key observation proved by Lemma 7 in Appendix A and used below is
that in each of the four cases δ(v∗δi (G˜s¯) + v
∗δ
j (G˜s¯)) < 1 for every δ ∈ (0, 1).
For the link ls¯ms¯, with ls¯ = j and ms¯ = k, the punishment regime specifies that j
offer 1/2 − ε and k accept any offer at least as large. Suppose that k rejects an offer
greater than or equal to 1/2− ε. For this deviation, the equilibrium specifies that if nature
selects i to make an offer to j next period, then i offers δαv
∗δα
j (G˜s¯) and j accepts any
offer at least as large; if j is selected to make an offer to i the strategies are analogous.
By Lemma 7, δα(v
∗δα
i (G˜s¯) + v
∗δα
j (G˜s¯)) < 1, so players i and j have incentives to reach
agreement with respect to the G˜s¯-quasi-Markov payoffs. If i and j are not matched to
bargain with each other or they deviate from the described strategies then play reverts to
the default regime for the subsequent subgame. Thus k is punished by isolation (hk /∈
G˜s¯) in the event that the link ij is selected for bargaining, which occurs with probability
pij(G˜s¯) > 2 (minlm∈H∈G plm(H)/2)
n/2 = 2ε.11 As α → ∞, the limit payoff of k is 0 along
the one-period isolation path and 1/2 along any other path (Proposition 2). Hence k’s limit
expected payoff conditional on rejecting offers greater than or equal to 1/2 − ε from j is
1/2(1 − pij(G˜s¯)) < 1/2 − ε. The optimality of j’s offer of 1/2 − ε to k given k’s response
strategy and of k’s rejection of smaller offers are immediately checked (similarly to footnote
10).
For large α, the j punishes k regime for G˜ delivers payoffs smaller than 1/2− ε2 to k
and larger than 1/2 + ε2 to j for the following reasons. As α → ∞, the limit payoffs of j
and k are 1/2 + ε and respectively 1/2 − ε along the punishment path, which realizes with
11Indeed, n ≥ 4 and minlm∈H∈G plm(H)/2 < 1/2 wherever the punishment regime is defined.
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limit probability greater than ε (by an argument similar to footnote 9), and identical to the
corresponding limit quasi-Markov payoffs of 1/2 along any other path. The latter is true
since G˜ is perfect, and so is any subnetwork induced by subgames off the punishment path,
where players behave according to the corresponding default regime. By Proposition 2, j
and k receive limit quasi-Markov payoffs of 1/2 in such subgames.
The constructed strategies yield payoffs v∗δα(G) and satisfy all the equilibrium require-
ments in Γδα(G) for sufficiently large α. This contradiction with our initial assumption
completes the proof of the first part of the theorem. For the second part, note that the
constructed family of equilibria is asymptotically efficient by Remark 1. 
4. An Alternative Matching Technology
Thus far we assumed that bargaining proceeds via the probabilistic selection of links.
A natural alternative assumption is that individual players are selected according to some
probability distribution and a selected player i is free to activate a link with any of his
neighbors j. Once the link ij is activated, either i or j is chosen with equal probability to
propose a share, exactly as in the earlier model.
This alternative matching procedure may be more appealing in certain environments. For
example, one might have in mind a situation in which individual players are probabilistically
endowed with a bargaining opportunity and then proceed to contact a partner to realize
and negotiate over this opportunity. The links model, on the other hand, may be thought
of as one in which bargaining opportunities are particular to the joint capabilities of a pair
of players. Investigation of such an alternative model is of interest in itself and also allows
one to examine the robustness of the various equilibrium constructions we have developed
above.
To be specific, we analyze a model in which (a single) player i in the network G˜ is selected
to activate a link with probability pi(G˜). We assume that the latter probability is strictly
positive if and only if i is not isolated in G˜, and place no further restriction on the function
p for a given G˜ or across subnetworks G˜. Apart from the new matching technology (as
described here and above) all aspects of the model are exactly as before. We denote by Λδ(G˜)
the bargaining game generated by the network G˜, the selection function p, and the common
discount factor δ. The associated modified bargaining game, denoted Λ¯δ(G˜), is defined as
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in Section 3.12 The variables σ¯∗δ(G˜), v∗δi (G˜), p
∗δ
ij (G˜) are analogously derived from an MPE
σ¯∗δ(G) of Λ¯δ(G). Well-behaved sequences of discount factors (δα)α≥0 and the corresponding
limits v∗i (G˜) and p
∗
ij(G˜) as α→∞ are specified as in Definition 1.
The goal is to develop a parallel analysis for this new model. It turns out that the earlier
equilibrium constructions carry over with minimal changes in most instances. We sketch
the new proofs focusing on the parts that are significantly different. The statements of
Propositions 1 and 2, and Theorem 1 remain unaltered. Many of the proofs are essentially
unchanged. The modifications necessary for the new results are outlined in Appendix B.
5. Conclusion
Networks are ubiquitous in economic and social contexts and have been the subject of
extensive inquiry (Jackson (2008) offers an excellent overview). However, there has been
little analysis of decentralized trade in networks. Such models provide a natural framework
to investigate the connection between network structure, feasible agreements, the possibility
of efficient trade, and the division of the gains from trade. The present paper, along with
Manea (2011) and Abreu and Manea (2009), represents an initial step in this direction.
From an abstract perspective, our model is one of a stochastic game in which the set of fea-
sible payoffs changes irreversibly with the underlying state. There are no general results, not
even asymptotic ones, for such games. In our setting efficiency entails global (network) con-
siderations, whereas interactions and incentives are inherently local. Furthermore deviators
may, by reaching agreement, exit the game, thereby evading future punishment. This creates
a tension between individual optimization and global efficiency. We show how, nevertheless,
efficiency can be attained in (non-Markovian) equilibrium in such environments.
Our approach to the problem involves a variety of novel elements including the definition
of a modified game and the use of its MPEs as a non-constructive element in a larger
equilibrium construction, for which only a small set of incentives needs to be explicitly
addressed. Explicitly specifying any equilibrium is difficult in our setting and it is convenient
to be able to revert as much as possible to equilibrium constructs whose existence follows
from general arguments. The construction of rewards and punishments is constrained by,
12There is an important difference in the way imposed agreements work. If ij is G˜-efficient and i has a
G˜-inefficient link, then j is fined for making an offer that is rejected by i only when i activates the link ij.
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and indeed carefully customized in a canonical way to, the network under consideration. All
these ideas should prove useful in specifying particular (for instance, efficient) equilibria in
other network or, more generally, stochastic game settings.
Appendix A. Proofs for the First Model
Proof of Lemma 1. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that ˜˜N is a G˜-efficiently closed
set of players who are not all isolated in G˜ such that p∗ij(G˜) < pij(G˜) for all i, j ∈ ˜˜N with
ij ∈ G˜. Fix an efficient match ˜˜M of the subnetwork induced by the set of players ˜˜N in the
network G˜. By assumption, µ( ˜˜M) ≥ 1. Since p∗ij(G˜) < pij(G˜),∀ij ∈ ˜˜M , for sufficiently large
α we have p∗δαij (G˜) < pij(G˜), ∀ij ∈ ˜˜M .
Note that the inequality p∗δαij (G˜) < pij(G˜) implies that disagreement arises with positive
probability under σ¯∗δα(G˜) when i and j are matched to bargain with each other in the first
period of Γ¯δα(G˜). Suppose without loss of generality that i makes an offer that j rejects
with positive probability. Player i’s continuation payoff in the event of a rejection is at most
δαv
∗δα
i (G˜).
13 In the MPE σ¯∗δα(G˜), player j must accept any offer δαv∗δαj (G˜) + ε (ε > 0) with
probability 1. Hence making such an offer would leave i with a payoff of 1− δαv∗δαj (G˜)− ε.
To preclude any profitable deviation for i, we need to have δαv
∗δα
i (G˜) ≥ 1 − δαv∗δαj (G˜) − ε
for all ε > 0, which implies that δαv
∗δα
i (G˜) ≥ 1− δαv∗δαj (G˜).
The arguments above establish that, for sufficiently large α,
δα(v
∗δα
i (G˜) + v
∗δα
j (G˜)) ≥ 1,∀ij ∈ ˜˜M.
Adding up the inequalities above across all links in ˜˜M we obtain∑
ij∈ ˜˜M
δα(v
∗δα
i (G˜) + v
∗δα
j (G˜)) ≥ µ( ˜˜M).
As ˜˜N is G˜-efficiently closed, it follows that the players in ˜˜N can only reach agreements with
one another under σ¯∗δα(G˜). Since every player in ˜˜N can only be involved in one agreement,
and each agreement yields a unit total surplus, it must be that∑
k∈ ˜˜N
v∗δαk (G˜) ≤ µ( ˜˜M).
13This step takes into account the possibility that i may be fined for failing to reach an agreement with j in
the first period of Γ¯δα(G˜).
24 DILIP ABREU AND MIHAI MANEA
Therefore,∑
k∈ ˜˜N
v∗δαk (G˜) ≤ µ( ˜˜M) ≤
∑
ij∈ ˜˜M
δα(v
∗δα
i (G˜) + v
∗δα
j (G˜)) ≤
∑
k∈ ˜˜N
δαv
∗δα
k (G˜).
Since δα ∈ (0, 1), we need that
∑
k∈ ˜˜N v
∗δα
k (G˜) = µ(
˜˜M) = 0. This contradicts µ( ˜˜M) ≥ 1. 
Lemma 2 below, on which some of the preliminary results hinge, necessitates a review of the
Gallai-Edmonds decomposition theorem [10]. This is a graph theoretical result concerning
the structure of efficient matchings. The following partition of the set of vertices N˜ of the
network G˜ is essential for the result. The set of players under-demanded in G˜, denoted
U(G˜), consists of the players that are not always efficiently matched in G˜. The set of players
over-demanded in G˜, denoted O(G˜), consists of the players that are connected to at least
one underdemanded player. The set of players perfectly matched in G˜, denoted P (G˜),
consists of the players that are not under-demanded or over-demanded in G˜.14 Formally,
U(G˜) = {u|∃ efficient match M˜ of G˜, u /∈ M˜}
O(G˜) = {o|∃u ∈ U(G˜), uo ∈ G˜}
P (G˜) = N˜ \ (U(G˜) ∪O(G˜)).
We only state the contents of the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition theorem necessary for our
proofs.
Theorem 2 (Gallai-Edmonds). For every efficient match M˜ of G˜, for every o ∈ O(G˜) there
exists u ∈ U(G˜) such that uo ∈ M˜ . The sets P (G˜) and U(G˜)∪O(G˜) are G˜-efficiently closed.
Denote by Uˆ(G˜) the set of players in U(G˜) that are not isolated in G˜. Thus Uˆ(G˜) = ∅
(Uˆ(G˜) 6= ∅) means that G˜ is (not) perfect.
Lemma 2. Suppose that v∗i (G˜) + v
∗
j (G˜) ≥ 1 for all G˜-efficient links ij. Then v∗o(G˜) = 1 for
all o ∈ O(G˜).
Proof. Let M˜ be an efficient match of G˜. By hypothesis,
(A.1) v∗i (G˜) + v
∗
j (G˜) ≥ 1, ∀ij ∈ M˜.
14The terms under-demanded, over-demanded, and perfectly matched were coined in [3] and [16].
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Adding up the inequalities A.1 across all links in M˜ , we obtain
(A.2)
∑
ij∈M˜
v∗i (G˜) + v
∗
j (G˜) ≥ µ(G˜).
However, note that the constraints on the production technology imply that
(A.3)
∑
k∈G˜
v∗k(G˜) ≤ µ(G˜).
The inequalities A.1-A.3 can be satisfied only if they all hold with equality. Therefore,
v∗i (G˜) + v
∗
j (G˜) = 1,∀ij ∈ M˜(A.4)
v∗u(G˜) = 0,∀u /∈ M˜.(A.5)
The argument above shows that v∗i (G˜) + v
∗
j (G˜) = 1 for every G˜-efficient link ij (by
definition, every G˜-efficient link is part of an efficient match of G˜) and v∗u(G˜) = 0 for every
u ∈ U(G˜) (by definition, for every u ∈ U(G˜) there exists an efficient match of G˜ that does
not cover u).
Fix o ∈ O(G˜) and let M˜ be an efficient match of G˜. By the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition
theorem, there is a u ∈ U(G˜) such that uo ∈ M˜ . As argued above, v∗u(G˜) = 0 and v∗u(G˜) +
v∗o(G˜) = 1. Hence v
∗
o(G˜) = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. If for some network G˜ ∈ G with Uˆ(G˜) = ∅, v∗i (G˜) ≥ 1/2 for all i
that are always efficiently matched in G˜, then v∗i (G˜) = 1/2 for all such i. Indeed, this is a
consequence of the production technology constraint
∑
i∈G˜ v
∗δα
i (G˜) ≤ µ(G˜),∀α ≥ 0, which
in the limit as α→∞ becomes ∑i∈G˜ v∗i (G˜) ≤ µ(G˜). Hence it suffices to prove the first part
of the proposition.
For a contradiction, let G˜ be a counterexample to the first part of the proposition with
the least number of vertices. Then there is a player in G˜ who is always efficiently matched
in G˜ with limit G˜-quasi Markov payoff less than 1/2. Let l and h be a minimizer and
respectively a maximizer of the limit payoffs of players always efficiently matched in G˜, i.e.,
v∗l (G˜) ≤ v∗j (G˜) ≤ v∗h(G˜), ∀j /∈ U(G˜). By assumption, v∗l (G˜) < 1/2. Let pi′ denote the limit
probability as α→∞ that an agreement not involving l occurs in the first period of Γ¯δα(G˜)
under σ¯∗δα(G˜). We reach a contradiction in 4 steps.
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Step 1. v∗i (G˜ 	 {j, k}) ≥ 1/2 for all i ( 6= j, k) always efficiently matched in G˜ and every
G˜-efficient jk; if G˜ is perfect the condition holds with equality in all cases
By the minimality of the counterexample G˜, for any G˜-efficient link jk, if player i is always
efficiently matched in G˜	 {j, k} then v∗i (G˜	 {j, k}) ≥ 1/2. Then the first part of the step
follows from the observation that for any G˜-efficient link jk, a player who is always efficiently
matched in G˜ is also always efficiently matched in G˜ 	 {j, k}. The second part requires an
argument similar to the one showing that the first part of the proposition implies the second.
Step 2. l has at least two G˜-efficient links
Since l is always efficiently matched in G˜, there exists m such that lm is G˜-efficient.
Suppose that l is not G˜-efficiently linked to any player different from m. As l is always
efficiently matched in G˜, it must be that the link lm is part of every efficient match of G˜.
Thus lm also constitutes m’s unique G˜-efficient link. Hence l and m are only G˜-efficiently
linked to each other and bargain together in every subgame of Γ¯δ(G˜). Since l and m form
a G˜-efficiently closed set, Lemma 1 implies that p∗lm(G˜) = plm(G˜) > 0, which in turn leads
to v∗l (G˜) + v
∗
m(G˜) = 1. It can be easily argued that v
∗δα
l (G˜) = v
∗δα
m (G˜) for all α, so v
∗
l (G˜) =
v∗m(G˜) = 1/2, a contradiction.
Step 3. a contradiction is obtained if G˜ is perfect
Consider a deviation for player l from the first period behavior under σ¯∗δαl (G˜) to offering
slightly more than v∗h(G˜) to every player and rejecting every offer from any player. Regardless
of whether l needs to obtain some imposed agreements, the considered offers are accepted
under σ¯∗δαl (G˜) for large α because every player in G˜ has a limit payoff of at most v
∗
h(G˜).
15
By Step 1, as G˜ is perfect and l is always efficiently matched in G˜, player l enjoys limit
payoffs of 1/2 following an agreement in Γ¯δα(G˜) not including him. The deviation yields the
following equilibrium requirement in the limit
v∗l (G˜) ≥ pi(1− v∗h(G˜)) + pi′
1
2
+ (1− pi − pi′) v∗l (G˜),
15Recall that h is defined as a maximizer of the limit G˜-quasi Markov payoffs among the players always
efficiently matched in G˜. Since G˜ is perfect, all non-isolated players are always efficiently matched in G˜.
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where pi denotes the probability that player l is the proposer in the first period of Γ¯δα(G˜)
(pi′ is defined in the preamble of the proof). As v∗l (G˜) < 1/2 and pi > 0, it must be that
(A.6) v∗l (G˜) ≥ 1− v∗h(G˜), with strict inequality if pi′ > 0.
Let pi′′ and pi′′′ denote the limit probabilities as α → ∞ that, under σ¯∗δα(G˜), in the first
period of Γ¯δα(G˜) player h makes an offer that is accepted and an agreement not involving
h occurs, respectively. In the former situations h obtains limit payoffs of at most 1− v∗l (G˜)
(by an argument analogous to footnote 15), while in the latter h enjoys limit payoffs of 1/2
by Step 1. Hence
v∗h(G˜) ≤ pi′′(1− v∗l (G˜)) + pi′′′
1
2
+ (1− pi′′ − pi′′′) v∗h(G˜),
or equivalently,
(A.7) (pi′′ + pi′′′)v∗h(G˜) ≤ pi′′(1− v∗l (G˜)) + pi′′′
1
2
.
Note that pi′′ + pi′′′ > 0 by Corollary 1. If pi′ > 0 then 1/2 > v∗l (G˜) > 1 − v∗h(G˜) by
A.6, hence v∗h(G˜) > max(1 − v∗l (G˜), 1/2), leading to a contradiction in A.7. If pi′′′ > 0 then
v∗h(G˜) ≥ 1−v∗l (G˜) (A.6) and A.7 imply v∗h(G˜) ≤ 1/2, and hence v∗l (G˜) ≥ 1/2, a contradiction.
Therefore, pi′ = pi′′′ = 0, so the limit probability of an agreement that does not involve
both l and h is 0. By Corollary 1, it must be that l and h share a G˜-efficient link and
p∗lh(G˜) > 0. Moreover, A.7 and pi
′′ > 0, pi′′′ = 0 imply that v∗l (G˜) + v
∗
h(G˜) ≤ 1. By Step
2, l has another G˜-efficient link to a player m 6= h. As pi′′′ = 0, we need p∗lm(G˜) = 0. If
v∗m(G˜) < v
∗
h(G˜) then v
∗
l (G˜) + v
∗
m(G˜) < v
∗
l (G˜) + v
∗
h(G˜) ≤ 1, which contradicts p∗lm(G˜) = 0.
If v∗m(G˜) = v
∗
h(G˜) then we can replace h with m in the argument above to conclude that
p∗lm(G˜) > 0, contradicting p
∗
lm(G˜) = 0.
Step 4. a contradiction is obtained if G˜ is not perfect
By Step 1, l enjoys limit payoffs of at least 1/2 following an agreement in Γ¯δα(G˜) not
involving him. A deviation by l from the first period behavior under σ¯∗δαl (G˜) to avoiding
every agreement yields the following limit equilibrium requirement16
v∗l (G˜) ≥ pi′
1
2
+ (1− pi′) v∗l (G˜).
16There are no imposed agreements in Γ¯δα(G˜) because G˜ is not perfect.
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As v∗l (G˜) < 1/2, we need pi
′ = 0. Thus p∗ij(G˜) = 0 for all i, j 6= l. It follows that
v∗i (G˜) + v
∗
j (G˜) ≥ 1 for all G˜-efficient ij with l /∈ {i, j}.
Fix a player m such that lm is a G˜-efficient link. Since pi′ = 0, a deviation by l from
the first period behavior under σ¯∗δαl (G˜) to offering (slightly more than) δαv
∗δα
m (G˜) to m and
avoiding other agreements, yields the following limit equilibrium requirement,
v∗l (G˜) ≥
plm(G˜)
2
(1− v∗m(G˜)) +
(
1− plm(G˜)
2
)
v∗l (G˜),
which implies that v∗l (G˜) + v
∗
m(G˜) ≥ 1. This shows that
v∗i (G˜) + v
∗
j (G˜) ≥ 1 for all G˜-efficient ij with l ∈ {i, j}.
Therefore, all hypotheses of Lemma 2 are satisfied, so v∗o(G˜) = 1 for all o ∈ O(G˜).17 Since
v∗l (G˜) < 1/2 < 1, it must be that l /∈ O(G˜). Also, by assumption, l /∈ U(G˜). There need
to be players in U(G˜) ∪ O(G˜) who are not isolated in G˜ (G˜ is not perfect). By the Gallai-
Edmonds decomposition theorem, U(G˜)∪O(G˜) is a G˜-efficiently closed set. Then Lemma 1
implies that there exist i, j ∈ U(G˜) ∪ O(G˜) such that p∗ij(G˜) = pij(G˜) > 0. We have i, j 6= l
because l /∈ U(G˜) ∪O(G˜). This contradicts pi′ = 0.
The series of contradictions above completes the proof as outlined in the preamble. 
Lemma 3. Suppose that Uˆ(G˜) 6= ∅, i /∈ U(G˜) and v∗i (G˜) = 1/2. Then v∗g(G˜) ≥ 1/2 for every
g such that ig is a G˜-efficient link. If additionally lm is a G˜-efficient link with l,m 6= i and
p∗lm(G˜) > 0 then v
∗
i (G˜	 {l,m}) = 1/2.
Proof. Since G˜ is not a perfect network, there are no “imposed” agreements in Γ¯δα(G˜).
Deviations by i from the first period behavior under σ¯∗δαi (G˜) to avoiding agreements with
all players different from g and
• offering g (slightly more than) δαv∗δαg (G˜)
• making an unacceptable offer to g
17We emphasize that the arguments above do not prove that v∗o(G˜) = 1 for all o ∈ O(G˜) in general. The
latter conclusion has been obtained via a series of counterfactuals used in the proof by contradiction.
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yield the following equilibrium requirements
v∗δαi (G˜) ≥
∑
lm
p∗δαlm (G˜)δαv
∗δα
i (G˜	 {l,m}) +
pig(G˜)
2
(1− δαv∗δαg (G˜))
+
(
1−
∑
lm
p∗δαlm (G˜)−
pig(G˜)
2
)
δαv
∗δα
i (G˜)
v∗δαi (G˜) ≥
∑
lm
p∗δαlm (G˜)δαv
∗δα
i (G˜	 {l,m}) +
(
1−
∑
lm
p∗δαlm (G˜)
)
δαv
∗δα
i (G˜),
where summations are over the set {lm|lm is G˜-efficient, with l,m 6= i}. For all G˜-efficient
links lm with l,m 6= i, we have that i /∈ U(G˜	{l,m}) since i /∈ U(G˜). Thus v∗i (G˜	{l,m}) ≥
1/2 by Proposition 2. As v∗i (G˜) = 1/2 and v
∗
i (G˜	 {l,m}) ≥ 1/2 for all G˜-efficient links lm,
when we take the limit α→∞, the first inequality leads to v∗g(G˜) ≥ 1/2 and the second to
v∗i (G˜	 {l,m}) = 1/2 for all G˜-efficient links lm with p∗lm(G˜) > 0. 
Lemma 4. Suppose that ij is a G˜-inefficient link with v∗i (G˜) = v
∗
j (G˜) = 1/2. Then there
exists a sequence of links l1m1, . . . , ls¯ms¯ in G˜ 	 {i, j} with the following properties, where
G˜s := G˜	 {l1,m1, . . . , ls−1,ms−1},
(1) for s = 1, . . . , s¯, lsms is G˜s-efficient, and p
∗
lsms
(G˜s) = plsms(G˜s);
(2) G˜s¯+1 is perfect.
Proof. We construct the sequence iteratively. Suppose that we constructed l1m1, . . . , ls−1ms−1,
and that the goal has not been attained by step s− 1, i.e., Uˆ(G˜s) 6= ∅. Assume additionally
that v∗i (G˜s) = v
∗
j (G˜s) = 1/2. Clearly, ij is G˜s-inefficient, thus i, j /∈ U(G˜s). The definitions
below identify the next link in the sequence, lsms.
As i and j are always efficiently matched in G˜s with v
∗
i (G˜s) = v
∗
j (G˜s) = 1/2, Lemma 3
implies that v∗k(G˜s) ≥ 1/2 for all k connected by G˜s-efficient links to i or j. Hence,
v∗l (G˜s) + v
∗
m(G˜s) ≥ 1 for all G˜s-efficient lm with {i, j} ∩ {l,m} 6= ∅.
Suppose that there is no G˜s-efficient link lm in G˜s	{i, j} with p∗lm(G˜s) = plm(G˜s). Then
v∗l (G˜s) + v
∗
m(G˜s) ≥ 1 for all G˜s-efficient lm with {i, j} ∩ {l,m} = ∅.
Thus all hypotheses of Lemma 2 are satisfied by G˜s. Hence v
∗
o(G˜s) = 1 for all o ∈ O(G˜s).
Then i, j /∈ O(G˜s) because v∗i (G˜s) = v∗j (G˜s) = 1/2 6= 1. As argued above, i, j /∈ U(G˜s).
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There need to be players in U(G˜s)∪O(G˜s) who are not isolated in G˜s because Uˆ(G˜s) 6= ∅.
By the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition theorem, U(G˜s)∪O(G˜s) is a G˜s-efficiently closed set.
Then Lemma 1 implies that there exists a G˜s-efficient link lsms with ls,ms ∈ U(G˜s)∪O(G˜s)
such that p∗lsms(G˜s) = plsms(G˜s). Note that lsms ∈ G˜s	{i, j} because i, j /∈ U(G˜s)∪O(G˜s).
The link lsms is added to the sequence. The construction can be iterated if G˜s+1 is not perfect
because p∗lsms(G˜s) = plsms(G˜s) > 0 and Lemma 3 lead to v
∗
i (G˜s+1) = v
∗
j (G˜s+1) = 1/2. 
Lemma 5. Suppose that G˜ is a perfect network such that ij is G˜-inefficient and jk is G˜-
efficient. Let h be i’s match in an arbitrary efficient match of G˜ that includes the link jk.
Then there exists a sequence of links l1m1, . . . , ls¯ms¯ in G˜ 	 {h, i, j, k} with the following
properties, where G˜s := G˜	 {l1,m1, . . . , ls−1,ms−1},
(1) for s = 1, . . . , s¯, lsms is G˜s-efficient, and ms has a G˜s-efficient link to either i or j;
(2) the set of players in G˜s¯+1 	 {h, i, j, k} is G˜s¯+1-efficiently closed.
Proof. The construction proceeds iteratively as in Lemma 4. Let M˜ denote an efficient match
of G˜ that includes the links ih and jk. Suppose that we constructed l1m1, . . . , ls−1ms−1 in
M˜ , and that the goal has not been attained by step s − 1, that is, the set of players in
G˜s 	 {h, i, j, k} is not G˜s-efficiently closed. The definitions below identify the next link in
the sequence, lsms, also from M˜ .
By construction, ij is G˜s-inefficient, thus i and j are always efficiently matched in G˜s.
Suppose that there are no players in G˜s 	 {h, i, j, k} that have G˜s-efficient links to either i
or j. Then each of i and j can only have G˜s-efficient links to h or k (ij is G˜s-inefficient).
Since i and j are always efficiently matched in G˜s, it must be that in every efficient match
of G˜s each of the players h and k is matched to one of the players i and j. Thus {h, i, j, k}
is G˜s-efficiently closed, which leads to a contradiction with the assumption that the set of
players in G˜s 	 {h, i, j, k} is not G˜s-efficiently closed.
We established that there is a player ms in G˜s 	 {h, i, j, k} that has a G˜s-efficient link to
either i or j. Let ls be ms’s match in M˜ (ms is not isolated in G˜ as it is connected to i or
j, thus it is always efficiently matched in G˜ because G˜ is perfect). The link lsms is added to
the sequence. 
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Lemma 6. Suppose that the set of players in G˜ 	 {h, i, j, k} is G˜-efficiently closed. Then
there exists a sequence of links l1m1, . . . , ls¯ms¯ in G˜	{h, i, j, k} with the following properties,
where G˜s := G˜	 {l1,m1, . . . , ls−1,ms−1},
(1) for s = 1, . . . , s¯, lsms is G˜s-efficient, and p
∗
lsms
(G˜s) = plsms(G˜s);
(2) all players different from h, i, j, k are isolated in the network G˜s¯+1.
Proof. The sequence with the desired properties can be constructed by making repeated use
of Lemma 1. 
Lemma 7. Let G˜ ∈ G be such that only the players h, i, j, k are not isolated in G˜ and ij is a
G˜-inefficient link. Then players i and j have incentives to reach agreement with respect to the
G˜-quasi-Markov payoffs for every discount factor δ, i.e., δ(v∗δi (G˜) + v
∗δ
j (G˜)) < 1,∀δ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist G˜ satisfying the hypotheses
and δ ∈ (0, 1) such that δ(v∗δi (G˜) + v∗δj (G˜)) ≥ 1. Without loss of generality, assume that
v∗δi (G˜) ≥ v∗δj (G˜). To simplify notation, we write v∗δ and p∗δ for the payoff vector v∗δ(G˜) and
the agreement probability vector p∗δ(G˜), respectively.
Since ij is G˜-inefficient, every efficient match of G˜ contains two links. Suppose that there
is a unique G˜-efficient match in which i is matched to l and j to m ({l,m} = {h, k}).18
Then Γ¯δ(G˜) has a unique MPE, in which agreements are obtained only across the links il
and jm, and conditional on either link being selected for bargaining agreement occurs with
probability 1. The G˜-quasi-Markov payoffs satisfy v∗δi = v
∗δ
l < 1/2 and v
∗δ
j = v
∗δ
m < 1/2,
contradicting the assumption that δ(v∗δi + v
∗δ
j ) ≥ 1. Then it must be that G˜ admits more
than one efficient match. This means that G˜ contains all the links within the set {h, i, j, k}
except for hk.19
For each quadruple of parameters x, y, z, t ∈ [0, 1] with x + y + z + t < 1, we define the
following function cx,y,z,t : R4 → R4 (here the components of a vector v ∈ R4 are labeled in
18The link ij cannot belong to the match because it is G˜-inefficient.
19G˜ does not include the link hk because ij is G˜-inefficient.
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order by i, j, h, k, i.e., v = (vi, vj, vh, vk)),
cx,y,z,ti (v) = x(δvi + 1− δvh)/2 + y(δvi + 1− δvk)/2 + (z + t)δ/2 + (1− x− y − z − t)δvi
cx,y,z,tj (v) = z(δvj + 1− δvh)/2 + t(δvj + 1− δvk)/2 + (x+ y)δ/2 + (1− x− y − z − t)δvj
cx,y,z,th (v) = x(δvh + 1− δvi)/2 + z(δvh + 1− δvj)/2 + (y + t)δ/2 + (1− x− y − z − t)δvh
cx,y,z,tk (v) = y(δvk + 1− δvi)/2 + t(δvk + 1− δvj)/2 + (x+ z)δ/2 + (1− x− y − z − t)δvk.
It is easy to check that each such function is a contraction with respect to the sup norm on
R4, and hence has a unique fixed point. Two functions from this family play an important
role in our analysis, those obtained by setting x = p∗δih , y = p
∗δ
ik , z = p
∗δ
jh, t = p
∗δ
jk and x =
p∗δih + p
∗δ
jh, y = p
∗δ
ik + p
∗δ
jk, z = t = 0. For simplicity, we denote the corresponding functions by
f and g, respectively.
By definition, v∗δ is the unique fixed point of f .20 Intuitively, g shifts weight from the
terms corresponding to first period agreements that j reaches with h and k to the analogous
terms for i. We compare v∗δ to the unique fixed point of g, denoted u∗δ. First note that
v∗δh = fh(v
∗δ) ≥ gh(v∗δ) and v∗δk = fk(v∗δ) ≥ gk(v∗δ) because v∗δi ≥ v∗δj .
We next argue that v∗δi = fi(v
∗δ) ≤ gi(v∗δ), by proving that
p∗δih(δv
∗δ
i + 1− δv∗δh )/2 + p∗δjhδ/2 ≤ (p∗δih + p∗δjh)(δv∗δi + 1− δv∗δh )/2
p∗δik (δv
∗δ
i + 1− δv∗δk )/2 + p∗δjkδ/2 ≤ (p∗δik + p∗δjk)(δv∗δi + 1− δv∗δk )/2.
Since the two inequalities are analogous, we only establish the former. If p∗δjh = 0, there is
nothing to prove. Suppose that p∗δjh > 0. Since there is agreement between j and h with
positive probability p∗δjh in an MPE of Γ¯
δ(G˜) with payoffs v∗δ, it must be that δ(v∗δj +v
∗δ
h ) ≤ 1.
The latter inequality, coupled with the initial assumption that δ(v∗δi + v
∗δ
j ) ≥ 1, leads to
v∗δi ≥ v∗δh . Then (δv∗δi + 1 − δv∗δh )/2 ≥ 1/2 > δ/2, which immediately implies the first
inequality.
20When evaluated at an MPE with payoffs v∗δ, the system of equations f(v∗δ) = v∗δ does not assume
(despite appearances to the contrary) that player l accepts an offer from player m with the same probability
that m accepts an offer from l. In fact, these events have equal probabilities (plm(G˜)/2 or 0, respectively)
unless δ(v∗δl +v
∗δ
m ) = 1. In the latter case l’s payoff does not depend on the composition of the probability of
agreement withm because, conditional on the link lm being selected for bargaining, l receives his continuation
equilibrium payoff δv∗δl regardless of the identity of the proposer.
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The inequalities v∗δh ≥ gh(v∗δ), v∗δk ≥ gk(v∗δ), v∗δi ≤ gi(v∗δ), along with the definition of g,
can be used to prove inductively that
v∗δh ≥ gh(v∗δ) ≥ . . . ≥ g[a]h (v∗δ)
v∗δk ≥ gk(v∗δ) ≥ . . . ≥ g[a]k (v∗δ)
v∗δi ≤ gi(v∗δ) ≤ . . . ≤ g[a]i (v∗δ)
for all a ≥ 1, where g[a] denotes the function obtained by iterating g with itself a times.
Since g is a contraction with fixed point u∗δ, we need lima→∞ g[a](v∗δ) = u∗δ. Taking the
limit a→∞ in the inequalities above we obtain v∗δh ≥ u∗δh , v∗δk ≥ u∗δk , v∗δi ≤ u∗δi . In particular,
v∗δh +v
∗δ
k ≥ u∗δh +u∗δk . Summing up the equations defining the fixed points of f and g, we can
easily show that v∗δi +v
∗δ
j +v
∗δ
h +v
∗δ
k = u
∗δ
i +u
∗δ
j +u
∗δ
h +u
∗δ
k . It follows that v
∗δ
i +v
∗δ
j ≤ u∗δi +u∗δj .
Solving the linear system defining u∗δ, we get
u∗δi + u
∗δ
j =
1
1− δ + δs
(
2(1− δ)2 + 3δs
3δ
− 2(1− δ)
2(1− δ + δs)(4(1− δ) + 3δs))
12δ(1− δ)(1− δ + δs) + 9δ3r(s− r)
)
,
where r := p∗δih + p
∗δ
jh, s := p
∗δ
ih + p
∗δ
jh + p
∗δ
ik + p
∗δ
jk. Note that
2(1− δ)2(1− δ + δs)(4(1− δ) + 3δs))
12δ(1− δ)(1− δ + δs) + 9δ3r(s− r) > 0,
hence
u∗δi + u
∗δ
j ≤
2(1− δ)2 + 3δs
3δ(1− δ + δs) ,
which leads to
δ(u∗δi + u
∗δ
j ) ≤
2(1− δ)2 + 3δs
3(1− δ) + 3δs < 1.
Then δ(v∗δi + v
∗δ
j ) ≤ δ(u∗δi + u∗δj ) < 1, a contradiction with our initial assumption. 
Appendix B. Proofs for the Second Model
B.1. Changes for Lemma 1. The conclusion of Lemma 1 has to be changed to “Then
there is a player in ˜˜N who conditional on being selected to activate a link (but unconditional
on the selection of the proposer) reaches an agreement with limit probability 1.” The proof
follows the same steps.
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B.2. Changes for Proposition 2. Three modifications are necessary for the proof of
Proposition 2. First, in Step 3, the inequality pi′′ + pi′′′ > 0 follows from the new state-
ment of Lemma 1.
Second, also in Step 3, the claim that “if v∗m(G˜) < v
∗
h(G˜) then v
∗
l (G˜) + v
∗
m(G˜) < v
∗
l (G˜) +
v∗h(G˜) ≤ 1, which contradicts p∗lm(G˜) = 0” does not hold for every player m 6= h who is
G˜-efficiently linked to l, but must be true for some m ∈ M := arg min{k|kl is G˜-efficient} v∗k(G˜),
if the achieved minimum is less than v∗h(G˜). Indeed, min {v∗k(G˜)|kl is G˜-efficient} < v∗h(G˜)
and v∗l (G˜) + v
∗
h(G˜) ≤ 1 imply h /∈M and v∗l (G˜) + v∗m(G˜) < 1 for every m ∈M . For large α,
it must be that under σ¯∗δαl (G˜) player l activates a link with some m ∈M when selected and
reaches an agreement with conditional probability 1. This contradicts pi′′′ = 0 since h /∈M .
Third, in Step 4, the set of inequalities v∗i (G˜) + v
∗
j (G˜) ≥ 1 for all G˜-efficient ij with
l /∈ {i, j} can no longer be derived directly from the condition pi′ = 0. However, pi′ = 0
still leads to v∗l (G˜) + v
∗
m(G˜) ≥ 1 for all m such that lm is G˜-efficient. To obtain the former
set of inequalities in the alternative model, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that ij
minimizes v∗i (G˜)+v
∗
j (G˜) among all G˜-efficient ij with l /∈ {i, j} and that the minimized value
is less than 1. If i and l share a G˜-efficient link, then v∗i (G˜) + v
∗
l (G˜) ≥ 1 > v∗i (G˜) + v∗j (G˜),
so v∗l (G˜) > v
∗
j (G˜).
21 As in the previous paragraph, for large α, under σ¯∗δαi (G˜) player i must
reach agreements with a set of players who have limit payoffs equal to v∗j (G˜) with probability
1 conditional on being selected to activate a link. Player l cannot belong to the latter set
since v∗l (G˜) > v
∗
j (G˜) if il is G˜-efficient. This leads to a contradiction with pi
′ = 0.
B.3. Changes for Theorem 1 and Lemmata 4 and 6. We note that in the current
model we only know that p∗lm(G˜) > 0 in contexts where we earlier correctly asserted that
p∗lm(G˜) = plm(G˜). In fact it may be directly checked that the weaker hypothesis suffices for
the required conclusions both in the original model and the current one. In particular, the
statements and proofs of Lemmata 4 and 6, along with their application to the equilibrium
construction, need to be modified using this remark. Moreover, the definition of ε in the
proof of Theorem 1 has to be changed to reflect the new (strictly positive) limit probabilities
of rewards and punishments.
21Note that the inequality v∗l (G˜) > v
∗
j (G˜) is not ruled out by l’s definition if j is not always efficiently
matched in G˜.
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The proof of the new Lemma 4 necessitates an argument similar to the one sketched above
for Step 4 of Proposition 2.
After particular histories the equilibrium construction of Theorem 1 requires that when
a link lm is selected, player m is penalized relative to his payoffs in the default regime.
Depending on the context, this comes up in cases when m is chosen as the proposer or as
the responder. In the current model this occurs only if player l is selected and activates
the link lm and m plays the proposer or responder role, as the case may be in the initial
construction.
As in the original model, it is important that in the i tempted j regime for G˜ the
distribution over pairs reaching agreement for any subgame is identical to the one in the
corresponding default regime, so that i receives a payoff equal to his G˜-quasi-Markov payoff.
In the current model this is achieved by specifying that when j is selected to activate a link in
the last stage (s¯+ 1) of the i tempted j regime for G˜, he uses the probability distribution
over G˜s¯+1-efficient links given by σ¯
∗δα
j (G˜s¯+1) and receives the reward δα(1/2 + ε
2) from each
player with whom he activates a link.
The equilibrium specification needs to be adapted to the alternative model in the case of
Lemma 5 links lsms as follows. When nature selects ls on the punishment path, he activates
the link lsms and, if chosen to be the proposer, offers min{1−δαv∗δαls (G˜s)}∪{δαv∗δαk (G˜s)|kls is
G˜s-efficient} to ms.
Finally, the series of agreements on the path of the punishment regime leads to a network
G˜s¯ where only h, i, j, k are not isolated. To ease notation, we write G˜ for G˜s¯ and (ph, pi, pj, pk)
for (ph(G˜s¯), pi(G˜s¯), pj(G˜s¯), pk(G˜s¯)) henceforth. At this stage, the punishment regime specifies
that when nature selects j, he activates the link jk, and if chosen as the proposer, he offers
1/2− ε to k. In this situation k accepts only offers that are greater than or equal to 1/2− ε.
We provide incentives for k to accept such offers via the threat of an agreement between
i and j occurring in the next period with limit probability of at least min(pi, pj). The
agreement isolates k. As α→∞, the limit payoff of k is 0 when isolated and 1/2 otherwise.
If ε < min(pi, pj)/2 then player k has incentives to accept offers greater than or equal to
1/2−ε from j for large α since his limit payoff conditional on rejecting such offers is at most
1/2(1 − min(pi, pj)). In every circumstance not considered here play reverts to the default
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regime for the corresponding game. The optimality of j’s decision to activate the link jk
and offer 1/2− ε to k, and of k’s rejection of smaller offers are immediately checked.
It remains to implement the threat of isolating k by incentivizing either i or j to activate
the link ij and obtain an agreement. We need to consider several cases, covering all possible
realizations of G˜ and (ph, pi, pj, pk). Suppose first that there is a unique G˜-efficient match
in which i is matched to l and j to m ({l,m} = {h, k}).22 Then Λ¯δα(G˜) has a unique
MPE, in which players i and l (j and m) only activate the link il (jm) and reach immediate
agreement conditional on being selected for bargaining. The G˜-quasi-Markov payoffs are all
smaller than 1/2 and satisfy v∗δαi (G˜) = v
∗δα
l (G˜) T v∗δαj (G˜) = v∗δαm (G˜) iff pi + pl T pj + pm.
To fix ideas, assume that pi + pl ≥ pj + pm. The punishment regime specifies that when k
deviates from the prescribed strategy, i activates the link ij if selected in the next period.
Conditional on the activation of the link ij, depending on the selection of the proposer, i
and j offer each other δαv
∗δα
j (G˜) and δαv
∗δα
i (G˜), respectively, and accept only offers that
are at least as large as the recommended ones. If i is not selected to activate a link or i
and j deviate from the described strategies then play reverts to the default regime for the
subsequent subgame. Player i has incentives to activate the link ij and offer δαv
∗δα
j (G˜) to
j because 1− δαv∗δαj (G˜) ≥ max(1− δαv∗δαh (G˜), 1− δαv∗δαk (G˜), δαv∗δαi (G˜)). The optimality of
the rest of the constructed strategies is straightforward.
However, if G˜ admits more than one efficient match, it is possible that neither i nor j has
incentives with respect to the G˜-quasi-Markov payoffs to activate the link ij and reach an
agreement. Note that there are multiple G˜-efficient matchings only if G˜ contains all the links
within the set {h, i, j, k} except for hk.23 For such networks G˜, the threat of an agreement
between i and j that isolates k relies directly on modifications of MPEs for Λδα(G˜) (rather
than Λ¯δα(G˜)). This last ingredient for the equilibrium construction in the alternative model
is supplied by the following result.
Lemma 8. Let G˜ ∈ G be a network with the set of links given by {hi, hj, ij, ik, jk}. Then
for each α, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of Λδα(G˜) in which players i and j
reach an agreement with probability greater than or equal to min(pi(G˜), pj(G˜)) and player k
receives a payoff u∗δαk (G˜) satisfying lim supα→∞ u
∗δα
k (G˜) ≤ 1/2−min(pi(G˜), pj(G˜))/2.
22The link ij cannot belong to the match because it is G˜-inefficient.
23G˜ does not include the link hk because ij is G˜-inefficient.
BARGAINING IN NETWORKS 37
Proof. We distinguish between three cases. Consider first the case max(ph, pi, pj, pk) ≤ 1/2.
Then Λδα(G˜) admits an MPE in which the link ij is never activated, players mix between
activating their G˜-efficient links such that each player has total probability 1/2 of bargaining
and reaching an agreement in the first period, and all players have identical payoffs. A
subgame perfect equilibrium, which may be employed to threaten k with a probability pi+pj
of isolation, is obtained from this MPE by modifying i’s and j’s first period strategies to
activate the link ij and reach an agreement (according to the terms that proposers and
responders agree to in the MPE).
Consider next the case pi > 1/2. Then there exists an MPE of Λ
δα(G˜) in which players
h, k, and j have identical payoffs, which are smaller than i’s payoff. In this equilibrium player
i mixes between activating all his links, players h and k activate their respective links with j,
and player j mixes between activating the links jh and jk. The probability that i activates
the link ij converges to 0 as α→∞. Another subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained from
the MPE described above by modifying i’s first period strategy to activate the link ij and
obtain an agreement (on the same terms as in the MPE) with probability 1 conditional on
being selected to activate a link. The later equilibrium may be used as a threat to isolate k
with probability pi. The case pj > 1/2 can be treated similarly.
Finally, we consider the case ph > 1/2. In this situation Λ
δα(G˜) admits an MPE in which
players h and k have the largest and smallest payoffs, respectively, and players i and j have
identical payoffs. In this equilibrium both players h and k mix between activating their links
with i and j, and players i and j only activate their respective links with k. Agreement
is obtained in each case. Another subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained from the MPE
by modifying h’s and k’s first period strategies to activate their respective links with i and
reach agreements (on the same terms as in the MPE) with probability 1 conditional on
being selected to activate links. Clearly, in this equilibrium players h and k enjoy the same
payoffs as in the MPE, but it can be shown that j’s payoff becomes lower than k’s. We can
construct yet another equilibrium by translating the strategies in the latter equilibrium one
period forward and setting the first period strategies optimally given the continuation payoffs
conditional on first period disagreement. The new equilibrium may be used to threaten k
with a probability pi of isolation. Indeed, player i activates the link ij with probability 1
when selected by nature in the first period because j has the lowest continuation payoff and
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i prefers to reach an agreement with j rather than pass up the bargaining opportunity.24
The case pk > 1/2 is analogous. 
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